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Emerging trends indicate that the pace of economic espionage and 
trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating.  There 
appears to be multiple vectors of attack for persons and governments 
seeking to steal trade secrets.  Foreign competitors of U.S. 
corporations, some with ties to foreign governments, have increased 
their efforts to steal trade secret information through the recruitment 
of current or former employees.  Additionally, there are indications 
that U.S. companies, law firms, academia, and financial institutions 
are experiencing cyber intrusion activity against electronic 
repositories containing trade secret information.  Trade secret theft 
threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and 
places the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy.  These acts also 
diminish U.S. export prospects around the globe and put American 
jobs at risk. 
 As an Administration, we are committed to continuing to be 
vigilant in addressing threats—including corporate and state 
sponsored trade secret misappropriation—that jeopardize our status 
as the world’s leader for innovation and creativity.1 
The White House issued this statement regarding its strategy to combat trade 
secret theft in February of 2013.2  This new strategy emphasizes the growing 
problem of foreign state-sponsored data breaches.3  Recently, private 
companies and government agencies—ranging from Google to the U.S. 
                                                 
 1. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING 
THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1-2 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY], 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on 
_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf. 
 2. Id.  The White House issued this strategy report in tandem with a recent executive order 
promulgated on February 12, 2013.  See Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739-41 
(Feb. 19, 2013) (envisioning greater protection of trade secrets from foreign and domestic theft by 
(1) mandating that federal agencies inform American companies of known cyber security threats, 
and (2) coordinating with the National Institutes of Standards and Technology to impose stricter 
standards and better procedures to protect companies from cyber attacks). 
 3. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING 
U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE i (2011) [hereinafter ONCIX REPORT], available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf 
(“Foreign economic collection and industrial espionage against the United States represent 
significant and growing threats to the nation’s prosperity and security.”). 
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Chamber of Commerce—have reported network breaches by overseas entities 
seeking to gain access to strategic information.4 
The increasing vulnerability of domestic networks to state-sponsored groups 
underscores the related problem of trade secret theft committed by foreign 
actors.5  Overseas-based trade secret theft poses increasing financial and 
security risks to the United States.6  Although measuring specific loss is almost 
impossible, trade secret theft costs the United States between two and four 
hundred billion dollars annually.7  Despite its financial significance, trade 
secret theft goes largely unnoticed because it is widely under-reported.8  The 
various laws in place to protect trade secrets are ineffective due to the 
unavailability of a private cause of action, which impedes enforcement.9 
                                                 
 4. See Siobhan Gorman, China Hackers Hit U.S. Chamber, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204058404577110541568535300.html 
(reporting a cyber attack on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s computer network, resulting in the 
theft of “everything stored on its systems”); John Markoff, Hackers Said to Breach Google 
Password System, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2012, at A1, A3 (reporting that Chinese hackers stole 
Google’s intellectual property and compromised the email accounts of two human rights activists 
in China).  As a result of the breach of its password system, Google announced on its security 
blog that it would alert users if the company suspected that a cyber attack had compromised any 
of its users’ Gmail accounts.  Eric Grosse, Security Warnings for Suspected State-Sponsored 
Attacks, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (June 5, 2012, 12:04 PM), 
http://google/onlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2012/06/security-warnings-for-suspected-state.html.  
According to Google’s Vice President of Security Engineering, 
[w]e are constantly on the lookout for malicious activity on our systems, in particular 
attempts by third parties to log into users’ accounts unauthorized.  When we have 
specific intelligence—either directly from users or from our own monitoring efforts 
—we show clear warning signs and put in place extra roadblocks to thwart these bad 
actors. 
Today, we’re taking that a step further for a subset of our users, who we believe may be 
the target of state-sponsored attacks. . . . 
You might ask how we know this activity is state-sponsored.  We can’t go into the 
details without giving away information that would be helpful to these bad actors, but 
our detailed analysis—as well as victim reports—strongly suggest the involvement of 
states or groups that are state-sponsored. 
Id. 
 5. Google, for example, alleged that Chinese government-sponsored agents were 
responsible for the 2010 attack on its network.  See Gorman, supra note 4; Markoff, supra note 4, 
at A1. 
 6. ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1; ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 3. 
 7. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 8. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that, even if a company is aware that its 
trade secrets have been stolen, it may choose not to report the theft because of concerns for its 
reputation). 
 9. Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriation, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 474 (2006) (“Trade secret protection is the 
only branch of intellectual property [for which] there is not a private cause of action based upon 
federal statute.”). 
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To complicate matters, foreign, state-sponsored actors commit trade secret 
theft using increasingly sophisticated data collection techniques.10  Some 
actors actively target technologies that directly affect national security.11  
Digital information, cultural attitudes favoring open access to information and 
transparency, use of the Internet and mobile devices to communicate sensitive 
information, and the outsourcing and globalization of business all contribute to 
the increase of both domestic and foreign trade secret theft.12 
Given the serious risk and greater frequency of data breaches, policymakers 
have begun to take on a more active regulatory and oversight role.  For 
example, U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman proposed legislation to protect critical 
infrastructure from a cyber warfare attack.13  Similarly, Congress recently 
approved increased criminal penalties for trade secret theft.14  Finally, in 2011, 
U.S. Senator Chris Coons and former U.S. Senator Herb Kohl proposed 
additional legislation to provide a federal private cause of action for companies 
harmed by trade secret theft.15 
                                                 
 10. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 5–6 (providing examples of China’s and Russia’s 
sophisticated data-hacking programs). 
 11. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 4 (explaining that Chamber of Commerce breach was the 
latest in a series of economic espionage originating from China and threatening national security). 
 12. See James H.A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley & Peter J. Toren, Understanding the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 178 (1997) (“Outsourcing, 
collaborative engineering, and the virtual corporation have substantially increased the risk of loss 
through both inadvertence and espionage”); Nicole Pelroth, Traveling Light in a Time of Digital 
Thievery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A1 (explaining that trade secret theft is no longer “the 
work of insiders or disgruntled employees” because “it has become easier to steal information 
because of the Internet, the proliferation of smartphones and the inclination of employees to plug 
their personal devices into workplace networks and cart proprietary information around”). 
 13. See Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.3414, 112th Cong. (2012).  The Senate rejected the 
bill on August 2, 2012 after a failed vote for cloture.  158 CONG. REC. S5,919 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 
2012).  Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia revived the effort by introducing the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2013 in July of 2013.  See 159 CONG. REC. S5,909 (daily ed. July 24, 2013) 
(introducing the Cybersecurity Act of 2013, S.1353, 113th Cong. (2013)).  The bill was referred 
to the Committee on Science, Commerce, and Transportation for consideration on July 24, 2013.  
159 CONG. REC. S5,907 (daily ed. July 24, 2013). 
 14. See Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (increasing the monetary penalties under the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA) from a maximum of $500,000 to a maximum of $5 million for individual offenders, and 
from a maximum of $10 million to a maximum of the “greater of $10,000,000 or 3 times the 
value of the stolen trade secret to the organization, including expenses for research and design” 
for an organizational offender). 
 15. See 157 CONG. REC. S6,229-30 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011) (introducing Senate Amendment 
729, which would have amended the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 to 
provide for a private cause of action for trade secret theft); Press Release, Senator Coons 
Introduces Two Amendments to Currency Bill to Protect American Intellectual Property (Oct. 5, 
2011), http://www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senator-coons-introduces-two 
-amendments-to-currency-bill-to-protect-american-intellectual-property (describing legislation 
that would create “a single, uniform, nationwide cause of action” allowing private companies to 
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Furthermore, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive 
(ONCIX), which coordinates with several agencies and branches of 
government to track the impact of industrial espionage on American 
competitiveness and security,16 reported to Congress that trade secret theft 
through cyber technology “represent[s] significant and growing threats to the 
nation’s prosperity and security.”17  ONCIX’s findings reinforce the 
government’s interest in cyber security and emphasize the need for the recently 
proposed and enacted legislation. 
Defense-related technologies are a prime target for trade secret theft.  For 
example, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts approximately $400 
billion in business with private defense contractors annually, which provides 
access to and allows contractors to collect and maintain sensitive information 
and intellectual property.18  Consequently, the DOD requires contractors to file 
suspicious contact reports whenever they encounter activity that signals a 
possible threat.19  However, although private contractors working with the 
DOD are frequently targeted, only ten percent of contractors actually file 
reports when they detect suspicious activity.20  This scenario is troubling 
because if trade secret theft victims fail to report the crime, regulatory laws 
will not be enforced and harmful activity will not be deterred.21 
To ameliorate the harmful effects of the under-enforcement of trade-secret 
theft penalties and network vulnerabilities, this Article proposes an amendment 
to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), a federal statute that 
criminalizes industrial espionage and trade secret theft.22  The proposed 
                                                                                                                 
“sue for trade-secret theft in federal court”).  The amendment was tabled.  157 CONG. REC. 
S6,227 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011). 
 16. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at iii–iv (noting that, to create the report, ONCIX 
collaborated with “the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Army 
Counterintelligence Center (ACIC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), Defense Security Service (DSS), Department of Energy (DoE), Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of State (DoS), Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 
National Security Agency, and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS),” among others). 
 17. Id. at i (indicating that the use of “[c]yberspace” in business “amplifies these threats by 
making it possible for malicious actors, whether they are corrupted insiders or foreign intelligence 
services (FIS), to quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of stat while remaining anonymous 
and hard to detect.”). 
 18. Id. at A-1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (observing that defense contractors generally do not report trade secret theft unless 
the theft affects a contract with the Pentagon, largely because “reporting procedures are often 
cumbersome and redundant”). 
 21. See George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 530–31 
(1970) (arguing that, in order to achieve the optimal number of offenses,  “rational [law] 
enforcement” must have “expected penalties increasing with expected gains so there is no 
marginal net gain from larger offenses”). 
 22. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006 & Supp. 2012)).  A prior work proposed amending the EEA to mandate 
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amendment to the EEA seeks to make two changes to the existing law.  First, 
the proposed amendment imposes both civil and criminal penalties for the 
failure to report trade secret theft involving technology restricted by export 
control laws.  Second, the proposed amendment establishes a whistleblower 
defense to encourage parties to report suspected trade secret thefts or violations 
of the duty to disclose. 
Part I of the Article discusses the federal and state laws that protect trade 
secrets and the nexus between trade secrets and national security.  Part II 
demonstrates that the existing laws are largely unsuccessful in preventing, 
deterring, or remedying trade secret theft against U.S. companies.  Part II also 
examines the tension between the duty to preserve confidential information 
under agency law and the immunity granted to officers and directors under the 
fiduciary oversight doctrine developed by the Delaware courts.  Part III 
discusses the policy justifications for amending the EEA to impose an 
affirmative duty to report suspected trade secret thefts.  Finally, Part IV 
discusses the proposed amendment to the EEA and the expected positive 
impact that this change will have on trade secret management practices. 
I.  TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE SECRETS 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property23 that dates to the Middle 
Ages.24  The term “trade secret” encompasses a broad spectrum of information 
that can include customer lists,25 technical data,26 recipes,27 and methods of 
                                                                                                                 
affirmative disclosures as a measure to preserve national security.  Aaron J. Burstein, Trade 
Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic 
Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933 (2009).  Burstein’s article, in contrast to the instant work, does 
not address the specific changes to the EEA and the enforcement mechanics required to safeguard 
national security.  Id. at 982 (“For example, policymakers would need to decide upon triggers for 
breach reporting, the appropriate recipient(s) of reports, penalties for failing to comply with 
reporting requirements, and an agenda for using breach reports. Discussing these details is beyond 
the scope of this Article.”). 
 23. Trade secrets are quasi-property in the sense that the law punishes misappropriation of 
the trade secret, but it does not provide relief in cases involving the independent derivation of the 
secret—such as by reverse engineering—if the information was not misappropriated.  C.f. 1 
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01[2], 2–11 (2001) (explaining that “the 
possessor of a trade secret has a property right in [the information] that permits the possessor to 
restrict use and disclosure of it in many situations.”). 
 24. See Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal 
Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 5 (Nov. 13, 2004) (working paper), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=661543 (noting that medieval guilds 
“protected investments in training new members . . . which is a human capital formation function 
typically associated with modern ‘trade secret’ law”). 
 25. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102(4) (2012) (defining a “trade secret” to include a 
“listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers, or other information relating to any business 
or profession which is secret and of value”). 
 26. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1986) (defining a “trade secret” to include 
a “program”). 
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conducting business.28  Trade secrets can be critical intangible assets in a 
knowledge-based economy.29  Companies expend considerable resources to 
generate and protect trade secrets,30 especially information that is valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN).31  A VRIN resource has the 
potential to generate long-term and sustainable competitive advantage for 
companies.32 
Theft of a company’s trade secrets can occur in two ways: (1) inbound trade 
secret theft, and (2) outbound trade secret theft.33  Inbound trade secret theft 
occurs when trade secrets are brought into a company, with or without the 
company’s knowledge.34  Outbound trade secret theft, conversely, occurs when 
a company’s own trade secrets leave the company without its consent.35  This 
Article is primarily concerned with imposing an affirmative duty to disclose 
outbound trade secret theft. 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., id. (defining a “trade secret” to include a “formula,” “method,” or “process”); 
William Neuman, A Man With Muffin Secrets, But No Job to Go With Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2010, at A1, A3 (describing the trade secret claim Bimbo Bakeries USA—the owner of Thomas’ 
English muffins—filed against a former employee, which alleged that the employee stole the 
company’s secret “nooks and crannies” recipe). 
 28. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (defining a “trade secret” to include a 
“method” or “process”); Complaint para. 81, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. v. 
Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2862 (SCR) (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010), 2009 WL 1025597 
(alleging trade secret misappropriation by former employees of Starwood Hotels who stole 
several business materials, including Strategic Plans, “Brand Bibles,” and “‘Property 
Improvement Plans,’” or templates “for how to create the ‘the Ultimate W Experience’ in 
conversion properties, providing step-by-step details for how to convert a hotel property to a W 
branded hotel.”)  Starwood Hotels survived a motion to dismiss.  Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide, Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2862 (SCR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71436, 
at *26 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010). 
 29. David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509, 516–17 (1997). 
 30. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 28, at paras. 46–51 (describing the measure Starwood 
Hotels took to protect its business methods and processes, such as requiring employees to sign 
confidentiality agreements and certify compliance with the terms annually, securing networks and 
computers, allowing remote access to the company’s information only through a password 
protected system, and marking confidential documents). 
 31. See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory To 
Determine Covenant Not To Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 1009 (2012) (describing how 
businesses establish a legitimate business interest in non-compete cases through the ownership of 
a knowledge-based asset with VRIN properties); see also Jay Barney, Firm Resources and 
Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99, 105–07 (1991) (considered the seminal work 
on the resource-based theory of business strategy). 
 32. Barney, supra note 31. 
 33. See James Pooley & Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Trade Secrets and Corporate 
Governance: Best Practices, IPO LAW JOURNAL—TRADE SECRETS SECTION (Nov. 10, 2005), at 
1-2, http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/TS_CorporateGovernance.pdf. 
 34. See id. at 2. 
 35. See id. 
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A.  Regulation of Trade Secrets and Protection Against Trade Secret 
Misappropriation 
1.  Federal Law 
a.   The Economic Espionage Act 
The EEA was enacted in 1996 as a response to the rising economic value of 
information, the lack of adequate federal criminal sanctions, and the inability 
of state criminal laws to deter trade secret theft.36  The EEA was also meant to 
address the rise in post-Cold War, state-sponsored industrial espionage.37  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated that, at the time the EEA was 
enacted, nearly twenty-five countries had developed methods by which to 
illegally acquire the United States’ industrial secrets.38 
Under the EEA, a “trade secret” encompasses “all forms and types of 
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information.”39  This type of information includes “patterns, plans, 
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, 
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or 
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing.”40  This information only qualifies 
as a trade secret if “(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to 
keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public.”41 
The EEA criminalizes misappropriation of information that meets the 
statutory criteria of a trade secret.42  The EEA prohibits both the theft of trade 
secrets, undertaken by either domestic or foreign actors,43 as well as industrial 
espionage committed for the benefit of foreign state actors.44  Although the 
EEA authorizes the Department of Justice (DOJ) to initiate civil proceedings to 
enjoin violations of the Act, it does not create a private cause of action for the 
aggrieved parties.45  Consequently, victims of misappropriation must work 
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to obtain relief.  Penalties for misappropriating 
                                                 
 36. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 179–80. 
 37. See id. at 179 (explaining that one of the dual purposes of the EEA was to address “the 
apparent threat of industrial espionage sponsored by foreign states”). 
 38. Id. at 178–79. 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2006). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (criminalizing the “[t]heft of trade secrets”). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (criminalizing “[e]conomic espionage”). 
 45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2006) (providing for a civil cause of action and exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, but making no mention of a private cause of action). 
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trade secretes include imprisonment and fines assessed against the offending 
individuals and organizations.46  Congress recently amended the EEA to 
increase its monetary penalties for misappropriation.47 
b.  The International Trade Commission and Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 
Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) has the authority to consider unfair trade practices, 
including trade secret misappropriation involving imported products.48  In 
TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the ITC’s authority under Section 337 to apply 
domestic law to trade secret misappropriation occurring outside of the United 
States if the products related to those trade secrets were imported into the 
United States.49  Commentators largely agree that the ITC is a more attractive, 
expedient, and powerful regulator of foreign trade secret theft, particularly for 
larger companies that can shoulder the litigation expenses.50  Indeed, if the ITC 
rules in favor of the trade secret owner, it may issue an “exclusionary order” 
that prevents the defendant from shipping the implicated goods into the United 
States.51  However, the ITC is not likely to play an adjudicatory role in cases 
affecting national security, which involve information that will benefit a 
                                                 
 46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832.  For example, in 2010 scientist Kexue Huang was charged 
with stealing trade secrets from his former employer, Dow Agrosciences.  Press Release, Chinese 
National Sentenced to 87 Months in Prison for Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets 
(Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1696.html.  
He was accused of using those secrets to conduct research that would benefit Chinese 
universities.  Id.  Huang ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eighty-seven months in 
prison.  Id. 
 47. See supra note 14 (describing the penalty increases imposed by the Foreign and 
Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012). 
 48. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703–04 (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1337 (2006)) (creating the ITC and authorizing it to investigate and adjudicate cases 
involving imports that allegedly infringe intellectual property rights and injure domestic 
industry). 
 49. 661 F.3d 1322, 1332–34 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 50. See Ernest P. Shriver, Separate But Equal: Intellectual Property Importation and the 
Recent Amendments to Section 337, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 441, 463–64 (1996). 
 51. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (“If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation 
under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, 
imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the 
United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and 
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly 
competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles 
should not be excluded from entry.”); see also Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Holdup, The ITC, and the Public Interest 105, 122 (Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 
2022168, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022168 
(arguing that the ITC should apply economic and public policy analyses to its exclusion order 
decisions). 
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foreign state rather than information that can be used to develop or influence 
export markets.52  Misappropriation of information relating to national security 
is outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the ITC.53 
c.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a federal statute that 
criminalizes a broad range of actions related to the unauthorized access of a 
protected computer, or a computer used in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.54  The CFFA criminalizes, inter alia, the unauthorized use of a 
protected computer to obtain information or to commit fraud.55  The statute 
imposes both criminal and civil penalties, including compensatory damages 
and equitable relief for the wronged parties.56  The CFAA has a broad scope, 
as it prohibits the unauthorized access of a computer, regardless of whether the 
computer stores trade secret information.57 
Additionally, the CFAA specifically criminalizes the use of a protected 
computer to obtain national security information.58  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) 
                                                 
 52. See ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 1, Appx. B (describing several cases of 
trade secret theft and economic espionage involving technical military data stolen to improve 
Chinese defense systems); ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 4–5 (noting that foreign actors, 
especially from China and Russia, focus their economic espionage and trade secret 
misappropriation efforts on information related to national security and military intelligence). 
 53. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (delineating the authority of the ITC to investigate import 
violations that affect the industry and commerce of the United States). 
 54. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190–91 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)) (criminalizing unauthorized access of a computer containing 
sensitive information).  Specific reference to “protected computers” was added to § 1030 in 1996.  
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-294, § 201, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491–92 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).  A “protected computer” is a computer 
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, 
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial 
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense 
affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or 
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, 
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (explaining that an individual violates § 1030(a)(4) if he 
“knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or 
exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains 
anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of 
the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period”). 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (defining damages as “any reasonable costs to any victim, 
including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the 
data, program, system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, 
cost incurred, or consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service”). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (listing the information and sources of information protected by the 
statute and failing to limit that protection to trade secrets). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).  This section provides that any individual who 
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prohibits the use of a protected computer without authorization or in excess of 
authorization and the subsequent willful supply of the information obtained to 
an unauthorized recipient.59  The statute also prohibits the willful retention of 
that information.60  However, despite the CFAA’s national security provision, 
the statute is rarely used to prosecute national security cases because, 
according to the DOJ, other anti-espionage statutes offer a better precedential 
foundation and broader enforcement coverage.61 
2.  State Law 
Each state has enacted laws, both statutorily and judicially, that protect trade 
secrets.62  Trade secret protection largely depends on the state’s substantive 
definition of a trade secret and the actions that constitute a violation of the 
property rights to a trade secret, or the “misappropriation” of the trade secret.63 
Forty-six states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) to 
define, regulate, and protect trade secrets.64  Under the UTSA, a trade secret is 
information that 
                                                                                                                 
having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been 
determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute 
to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or 
foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information so obtained 
could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign 
nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be 
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive 
it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the 
United States entitled to receive it . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of 
this section. 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1). 
 60. Id. 
 61. H. MARSHALL JARRETT & MICHAEL W. BAILIE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 15 
(2d ed.), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf (last visited August 23, 
2013) (explaining that Assistant United States Attorneys rarely charge § 1030(a)(1) violations 
because of “the close similarities between sections 1030(a)(1) and 793(e),” and that, “[i]n 
situations where both statutes are applicable, prosecutors may tend towards using section 793(e), 
for which guidance and precedent are more prevalent”). 
 62. See David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept “Efforts 
Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy”, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 322–23 (1989) (noting that modern trade secret protection is based on the 
codification of common law decisions). 
 63. See Michael J. Hutter, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Lawyer’s Practical Approach 
to the Case Law 1 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978) (explaining that classification as a trade 
secret under the controlling law and “acquisition of the secret by a third party by improper 
conduct or unfair means” are prerequisites for liability for trade secret misappropriation). 
 64. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3.29 (2013) (noting that every state except 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Texas has adopted the UTSA). 
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derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and [] is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.65 
The “information” in question can be “a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process.”66  A trade secret under the 
UTSA largely parallels the definition of a trade secret in the EEA.67 
Although there is little state law that protects against outbound theft, all 
states impose civil penalties for inbound trade secret theft.68  For example, 
trade secrets can be misappropriated in a UTSA jurisdiction in two ways.  
First, misappropriation may constitute “acquisition of a trade secret of another 
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by improper means.”69  Second, a trade secret is misappropriated if it 
is disclosed 
without express or implied consent by a person who   
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that 
his knowledge of the trade secret was 
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper 
means to acquire it; 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use; or 
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had 
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had 
been acquired by accident or mistake.70 
Acquiring a trade secret by “improper means” includes “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach to maintain secrecy, or 
                                                 
 65. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1986). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12 at 188–89 (comparing the UTSA and the EEA); 
see also supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (detailing the definition of a trade secret under 
the EEA). 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995) (defining 
“appropriation” of trade secrets as the receipt of the information by an unauthorized individual or 
in an unlawful manner); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (defining “misappropriation” in the 
same manner).  Each state has developed a trade secret enforcement scheme based on the UTSA 
or the Restatement.  Craig L. Ulrich, The Economic Espionage Act: Reverse Engineering and the 
Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147, 163–64 (2001). 
 69. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i). 
 70. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii). 
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espionage through electronic or other means.”71  The definition of 
misappropriation under the UTSA is narrower than its counterpart in the 
EEA.72 
Although they have not adopted the UTSA, Massachusetts,73 New York,74 
North Carolina,75 and Texas76 each regulate trade secret misappropriation in a 
similar way.  Many states have also enacted statutes that criminalize trade 
secret theft; however, there are significant obstacles to enforcing these statutes, 
including limited state budgets and jurisdiction that is restricted by the state’s 
borders.77 
                                                 
 71. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1). 
 72. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12 at 188–89 (comparing the UTSA and the EEA); 
see also supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (noting that the EEA prohibits any unlawful 
access to information that meets the statutory definition of “trade secret”). 
 73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30(4) (West 2008) (defining “trade secret” as 
“anything tangible or intangible or electronically kept or stored, which constitutes, represents, 
evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production or management 
information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention or improvement”). 
 74. New York trade secret protection is entirely common law based, and adopts the 
definition of a trade secret provided by Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts.  Ashland Mgmt. 
Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 407 (1993) (relying on the Restatement and state precedent to 
adjudicate a trade secret misappropriation case); Michael J. Hutter, The Case for Adoption of a 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act in New York 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH 1, 6 (1999) (stating that New 
York has not adopted a statutory regime to regulate trade secrets and instead relies on “common 
law principles derived from the First Restatement of Torts”).  The Restatement defines a trade 
secret as 
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of 
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, 
or a list of customers. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
 75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2011) (defining a “trade secret” as “business or technical 
information, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of 
information, method, technique, or process that (a) Derives independent actual or potential 
commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent 
development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use; and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy”). 
 76. Like New York, Texas regulates trade secrets with common law decisions based on the 
Restatement of Torts.  In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b) (“To determine whether a trade secret exists, this Court applies 
the Restatement of Torts’ six-factor test.”). 
 77. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12 at 186 (stating that twenty-four states have 
criminal trade secret theft statutes, but that “the applicability of these state criminal laws is 
limited by jurisdiction and lack of state resources, particularly in cases with international 
ramifications”). 
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3.  Private Protection of Trade Secrets 
In addition to the common law and state and federal statutory regimes 
designed to deter and rectify trade secret theft, owners of sensitive information 
often use private legal and non-legal mechanisms to preemptively secure 
information.  For example, companies often employ non-disclosure 
agreements, confidentiality agreements, and covenants-not-to-compete to add 
layers of protection to their confidential data.78  Additionally, companies may 
use property systems such as patents or copyrights, in conjunction with trade 
secrets, to increase information security.79  Finally, companies may use  
non-legal mechanisms used to protect trade secrets, such as well-designed 
human resource and compliance systems,80 protected networks, and encryption 
devices.81 
B.  National Security Implications 
According to ONCIX, trade secret theft by foreign agents has clear and 
significant implications for national competitiveness because many of the 
country’s most profitable and rapidly-growing industries are targeted for trade 
secret theft.82  For example, ONCIX states that clean technologies—energy 
-generating technologies that reduce carbon dioxide emissions—are highly 
valued targets for acquisition.83  Clean technologies have been linked to long 
-term energy security,84 and investments in these technologies have grown 
quickly as a result.85  Similarly, pharmaceuticals, nanotechnology, and 
agricultural technologies—all of which are industries characterized by high 
                                                 
 78. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 995–96; Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 
218. 
 79. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 996. 
 80. See, e.g., Russell W. Coff, Human Assets and Management Dilemmas: Coping with 
Hazards on the Road to Resource-Based Theory, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 374, 380–87 (1997), 
available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/259327 (discussing the use of incentives, symbolic gestures, control 
rights, and shared governance as methods to retain employees). 
 81. Ari B. Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV., 51, 92–93 (1998). 
 82. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9 (explaining that foreign collection of U.S. civilian 
technologies follows market patterns of investment and trade). ONCIX predicts that clean 
technologies, advanced materials and manufacturing techniques, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and 
agricultural technologies will experience a surge in investment and therefore will be targeted 
aggressively for acquisition.  Id. 
 83. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
 84. See David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers in the Software, Biotechnology and 
Clean Technology Industries, in THE CHANGING FACE OF US PATENT LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON 
BUSINESS STRATEGY 42, 54–56 (Daniel C. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald eds. 2013); see also Daniel 
R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L. J. 
805, 829–31, 834 (2012). 
 85. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
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research and development costs—are also targeted frequently for theft.86  Loss 
of trade secrets in these quickly-evolving areas of business has a direct impact 
on national competitiveness.  As one government enforcement official 
explained, “[w]e’ve already lost our manufacturing base. . . .  Now we’re 
losing our R. & D. base.  If we lose that, what do we fall back on?”87 
Trade secrets also significantly affect national security if they relate to 
classified information or information pertaining to military technologies.  
ONCIX stated that the “illicit transfer of technology with military applications 
to a hostile state [or organization] could endanger the lives of US and allied 
military personnel.”88  Some military technologies are especially susceptible to 
trade secret theft;for example, according to ONCIX and the DOD, 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are routinely targeted for theft.89 
Many technologies related to national security are categorized as dual-use 
technologies, or technologies that can be used for both military and non 
-military purposes.90  Consequently, many dual-use technologies are 
regulated under export control laws rather than trade secret laws.  For example, 
the Export Administration Act of 1979 authorizes the President to control U.S. 
exports for the purpose of national security.91  The Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) is responsible for administering and 
enforcing the Export Administration Act.92 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 8–9. 
 87. Nicole Perlroth, Traveling Light in a Time of Digital Thievery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2012, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; see also United States v. Dongfan Chung, 659 F.3d 
815, 828 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the conviction of the defendant for violating the EEA by 
unlawfully transferring trade secrets pertaining to military aircraft technology). 
 89. DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE, TARGETING U.S. TECHNOLOGIES 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.dss.mil/counterintel/2011-unclassified-trends.pdf (describing AUVs as “a class of 
underwater vessels capable of submerged, self-propelled locomotion using various enabling 
technologies to navigate and perform diverse tasks”). 
 90. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCE DEPARTMENT EXPORT 
CONTROLS 1 (2010) [hereinafter DEP’T OF COMMERCE], available at http://www.bis.doc. 
gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/142-eccn-pdf. 
 91. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, §§ 3(2)(B), 5(a)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 
504, 506 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2402, 2404) (authorizing the President to “prohibit or 
curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or 
exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” to the extent necessary 
“to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared 
international obligations”). 
 92. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90.  The BIS enforces the Export Administration 
Act by issuing Export Administration Regulations (EARs).  Id.  An important aspect of these 
regulations is the Commerce Control List (CCL), which includes all of the technologies that fall 
under the EARs.  Id. at 3.  These technologies include broad categories such as: nuclear 
technologies, materials, chemicals, microorganisms, materials processing technologies, 
electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors and lasers, navigation 
and avionics, marine and propulsion systems.  Id.; see also 15 C.F.R. § 777 Supp. 1 (2012) 
(containing the full Commerce Control List). 
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The Department of Commerce defines an export as “any item that is sent 
from the United States to a foreign destination.”93  Under the Department’s 
regulations, the method of exportation is immaterial; the item may be classified 
as an export if it is sent via regular mail, hand carry, facsimile, the Internet, by 
telephone, or delivered in person.94  Because trade secret theft is increasingly 
committed by foreign actors targeting a broad array of technologies that are 
regulated by export controls, many thefts have, as a practical matter, the same 
effect as the unauthorized exportation of goods.95 
The BIS has the authority to regulate military technologies, dual-use 
technologies, and even some purely commercial technologies with export 
controls.96  Regulated technologies are categorized with an Export Control 
Classification Number (ECCN), which identifies items based on the nature of 
the product.97  ECCNs allow exporters to determine the “reasons for control,” 
which transactions require an export license (based on the country of 
destination), and which license exceptions, if any, apply.98 
II.  THE CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
LAWS 
A.  Under-Enforcement 
Trade secrets can be difficult to manage and protect.  First, the protection of 
trade secrets hinges on fiduciary relationships, which trigger mutual and 
corresponding duties.99  Unlike patents, trademarks, designs, and copyrights, 
the safeguarding of trade secrets largely depends on individuals’ ability to 
uphold the legal duties that arise from fiduciary relationships.100 
                                                 
 93. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90, at 2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Compare ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 8–9 (noting that economic, scientific, and 
military data are subject to trade secret theft and predicting that dual-use technologies such as 
clean technologies, advanced manufacturing techniques, healthcare and pharmaceutical 
technologies, agricultural technology, and energy and national resource information will be 
increasingly vulnerable to misappropriation), with DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90, at 1–2 
(noting that dual-use technologies and chemicals, materials processing, computers, and 
telecommunications and information security are all subject to export controls), and 15  
C.F.R. § 777 Supp. 1 (listing other scientific technologies in the Commerce Control List regulated 
by export laws). 
 96. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 90, at 1. 
 97. Id. at 3. 
 98. Id. at 5–6 (providing instructions for determining whether a license is necessary for a 
particular good or technology and whether a licensing exception applies). 
 99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01(e) (2005).  Contracts such as non 
-disclosure agreements, confidentiality agreements, and covenants not to compete may 
supplement the default duties arising under agency.  See id. (“In addition to an agent’s fiduciary 
duties, the agent has a duty to fulfill specific contractual undertakings” imposed by the principal). 
 100. The need for fiduciary controls is because trade secrets do not possess traditional in rem 
property characteristics.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) (rejecting the 
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Trade secrets, like other intangible assets, are non-excludable;101 absent 
vigorous monitoring and expensive judicial enforcement, trade secrets are 
freely accessible.102  To successfully plead trade secret misappropriation, the 
plaintiff must overcome a defense of independent derivation, under which the 
defendant claims that he discovered the trade secret through reverse 
engineering, or through other permissible means.103  The burden is also on the 
plaintiff to prove that he expended reasonable efforts to preserve secrecy.104  
This standard can be challenging to satisfy in cases in which the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
idea that the prohibition of trade secret misappropriation is based in the owner’s property right in 
the information); MILGRIM, supra note 23, at § 2.01 (noting that the “property” right in a trade 
secret is the right to use and disclose the information). 
 101. See MILGRIM, supra note 23, at § 2.01 (“[N]either the owner of a trade secret or a 
copyright can use its rights to prevent genuine independent development by others.”).  See 
generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 1-19 (1999) (discussing the “information economy”).  Although other 
categories of intangible property—such as patents, trademarks, and copyright—face challenges 
involving non-excludability and costly enforcement, protection of these other forms of 
intellectual property is not as under-enforced as protection of trade secrets because of measures to 
reduce enforcement costs.  See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee 
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 346, 351–55 (2012) (describing the 
rise of contingent-fee agreements in patent litigation).  Rather, protection of this information is 
often vigorously enforced.  For example, policymakers in the field of trademark law have held 
hearings on the aggressive enforcement and policing of trademarks by large companies against 
smaller companies and individuals, leading to what is termed “trademark bullying.”  See 
Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, § 4(a)(1), 
124 Stat. 66, 70 (requiring the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to study and report to Congress 
“the extent to which small businesses may be harmed by litigation tactics by corporations 
attempting to enforce trademark rights beyond a reasonable interpretation of the scope of the 
rights granted to the trademark owner”).  The under-enforcement of trade secret law, therefore, is 
an anomaly. 
 102. Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 4–5 (explaining that, because of the ease 
with which intellectual property can be copied, owners of intellectual property keep the 
information closely guarded and protect their rights with increased protection).  In 2011, the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) conducted surveys to determine the 
costs of intellectual property litigation.  AM. INTELL. PROP. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2011 (2011).  The survey found that, in cases in which the amount in controversy was 
less than $25 million, the cost of trade secret litigation through trial was $1.3 million.  Id.  If the 
amount in controversy exceeded $25 million, the cost of litigation increased to $3.2 million.  Id.  
 103. See, e.g., Int’l Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 709–10 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 
(dismissing the plaintiff’s trade secret theft claim because the defendant established that it 
developed its own market to sell its product, rather than misappropriating the plaintiff’s customer 
list data).  Reverse engineering is “the process of studying an item in hopes of obtaining a 
detailed understanding of the way it works,” and is “used to create duplicate or superior products 
without the benefit of having the plans for the original item.” Uhrich supra note 68 at 155–56. 
 104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2006) (requiring the owner of information to “take 
[] reasonable measures to keep such information secret” for the information to be classified as a 
trade secret); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1986) (requiring that the information be “the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy” for the 
information to be classified as a trade secret); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b 
(1939) (“The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.”). 
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created the protected information with the help of third parties, especially if the 
value of the information has appreciated over time.105 
Similarly, significant hurdles impede the enforcement of criminal trade 
secret laws.  Indeed, many believe that the DOJ imposes substantial 
prerequisites for enforcement under the EEA.106  According to some accounts, 
U.S. attorneys’ offices have imposed a six- or seven-figure loss requirement as 
a precondition for prosecution.107  The DOJ is also hesitant to criminally 
prosecute cases unless a civil remedy is unavailable.108  Additionally, there are 
several other factors that discourage parties from pursuing an EEA claim, such 
as the higher burden of proof necessary to criminally convict under the EEA, 
the possibility of a lengthy grand jury investigation, the federal government’s 
exclusive management of important litigation issues, the forfeiture of the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity afforded by civil trials, 
and the lack of monetary damages.109  These restrictions may prevent firms 
from reporting trade secret theft, compounding the public safety concerns 
surrounding the theft of information affecting national security. 
Despite the difficulty in addressing trade secret theft, civil litigation of 
domestic trade theft is on the rise, demonstrating the importance of trade secret 
information.110  However, this increase reflects only domestic civil suits, not 
claims brought under the EEA.111  Indeed, although ONCIX reports that trade 
                                                 
 105. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 1011.  A recent high-profile example of a 
company’s failure to keep data secret involved hackers stealing LinkedIn account users’ 
passwords.  Nicole Perlroth, Lax Security at LinkedIn is Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, at 
B1.  The media widely reported that the breach was the result LinkedIn’s out-of-date and 
inadequate security systems.  See, e.g., id. 
 106. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 210–11 (noting that an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney’s decision to prosecute a trade secret misappropriation case is subject to DOJ approval, 
from either the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General 
from the Criminal Division).  U.S. Attorneys’ offices consider a number of factors in determining 
whether a trade secret case will be prosecuted, including “(a) whether the information was clearly 
a trade secret; (b) whether the information was technical or scientific in natures; (c) evidence of 
criminal conduct and intent; (d) evidence of the information’s monetary value; (e) the availability 
of other remedies; and (f) whether the misappropriation was promptly reported.”  Id. at 211. 
 107. Victoria Slind-Flor, Industry Spying Still Flourishes, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 29, 2000, at B8; 
see also Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 214 (indicating that “the monetary loss to the 
victim must be great enough to merit criminal investigation and prosecution,” greater than 
$100,000 in some districts). 
 108. Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 12, at 215. 
 109. Joseph N. Hosteny, The Economic Espionage Act: A Very Mixed Blessing, INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY, Feb. 1998, 7–8, http://www.hosteny.com/articles/espionage.html. 
 110. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 66–68 (2011) [hereinafter State Court Analysis] (finding that trade 
secret litigation in federal courts is increasing at an exponential rate, but at the same time is 
increasing at only a modest rate in state courts). 
 111. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal 
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 303–04 (2009) [hereinafter Federal Court Analysis].  The 
Almeling study of trade secret litigation in federal courts concluded that concerns about foreign 
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secret theft by foreign actors is growing at a considerable pace,112 this type of 
trade secret theft is rarely prosecuted.113  The restrictions imposed by the DOJ 
and the EEA itself likely discourage injured parties from reporting violations 
and from using the statute as an enforcement mechanism.  The failure to report 
trade secret theft and to enforce trade secret laws, in turn, motivates trade 
secret thieves to continue engaging in this profitable activity.114 
B.  Market Failures 
Given their status as valuable property rights, the marketplace should, in 
theory, provide adequate incentives to safeguard and enforce trade secrets.  
Evidence indicates that, although prosecution of domestic trade secret thefts 
has increased, cases involving foreign actors remain unenforced.115  This 
disparity, according to a market efficiency theory, is caused by (1) cross-border 
enforcement costs; (2) negative reputational impact; and (3) inadequate 
information technology (IT) and compliance capabilities. 
1.  Cross-Border Enforcement Costs 
Pursuing civil remedies in foreign trade secret theft cases under the EEA is 
often prohibitively expensive.  First, the complexities that arise during the 
discovery process can significantly raise litigation costs.116  To further 
complicate matters, each country has its own trade secret law and hiring local 
counsel with adequate knowledge of a foreign jurisdiction’s legal system and 
                                                                                                                 
trade secret misappropriation “may be overblown” because most trade secret theft is committed 
by domestic actors.  Id.  This statement, however, does not take into account the central problem 
of foreign trade secret theft, which is that the victim is often reluctant to pursue claims of foreign 
theft due to the inordinate costs of litigation.  See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text 
(discussing the barriers to trade secret law litigation and enforcement).  Moreover, there is a 
fundamental difference between domestic theft and foreign state-sponsored theft, adding to the 
disparity between the number of domestic theft cases and foreign theft cases.  While the majority 
of plaintiffs in domestic theft cases know the defendants, State Court Analysis, supra note 110, at 
69 (noting that domestic thieves are often former employees or business partners), data thieves in 
cases involving foreign actors are usually anonymous, Federal Court Analysis, supra, at 303. 
 112. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
 113. See id. at 5 (reporting that only seven cases were adjudicated under the EEA in 2010). 
 114. See id. at 4 (estimating that a company’s trade secret can be worth $20 million and that 
trade secret theft and economic espionage are responsible for the loss of up to $400 billion each 
year). 
 115. See State Court Analysis, supra note 110, at 66–68 (tracking the increase in trade secret 
theft litigation in state and federal courts); ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (reporting that 
there were only seven prosecutions under the EEA in 2010); Federal Court Analysis, supra note 
111, at 303–04 (noting that third parties, such as foreign actors, “comprise a small percentage of 
alleged misappropriators”). 
 116. See J. Benjamin Bai & Gupoing Da, Strategies for Trade Secret Protection in China, 9 
NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 351, 362 (2011) (explaining that there is no U.S.-style discovery 
process in China and discussing other technical hurdles that make discovery in foreign trade 
secret litigation more cumbersome than in domestic litigation). 
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paying for translation services can raise costs substantially.117  Similarly, 
attempting to gather evidence abroad can pose unique challenges that require 
patience, creativity, and significant resources.118 
Because it is so difficult to litigate, foreign trade secret theft is best reserved 
for federal authorities to address under the appropriate criminal statutes and 
with the aid of government intelligence information and enforcement 
mechanisms.  The U.S. government is especially interested in discovering the 
sources of the theft of sensitive information because of the national security 
concerns.119  The U.S. government, unlike private companies, has the 
intelligence capabilities needed to  uncover the sources of this theft.120  Private 
companies, on the other hand, are either unable to trace the party’s identity or 
unwilling to do so.121  It is also increasingly difficult for private companies to 
distinguish between cyber crime, trade secret theft, and the collection of 
economic or technological information by foreign intelligence services.122 
2.  Reputational Costs 
When a company discovers that a trade secret has been stolen, more often 
than not the company will choose not to seek legal remedy.  According to 
ONCIX, a company may keep a security breach private because it could 
“tarnish a company’s reputation and endanger its relationships with its 
investors, bankers, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders.”123  An 
empirical study using an event study methodology confirmed that the value of 
a publicly traded company can decrease by millions of dollars when the 
company announces that it has decided to work with federal officials to 
prosecute a case under the EEA.124  Many companies, absent regulations 
requiring affirmative disclosure, elect to remain silent and allow the theft to go 
unpunished.125  Moreover, the unavailability of civil damages under the EEA 
                                                 
 117. See R. Doak Bishop, International Litigation in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign 
Countries, 19 HOUS. L. REV. 361, 361 (1982). 
 118. Id.  See generally HAROUT J. SAMRA, THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF 
USING U.S. DISCOVERY IN AID OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS (2013), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac 
2013/sac_2013/13_using_discovery_in_aird.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing various techniques to 
conduct U.S.-style discovery abroad). 
 119. ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1 (expressing a commitment to 
prosecuting foreign trade secret theft, which “threatens American businesses, undermines national 
security, and places the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy”). 
 120. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
 121. Id. at 1–2 (noting that private companies are more concerned with addressing the 
damage caused by trade secret theft than identifying the perpetrator). 
 122. Id. at 1. 
 123. Id. at 3. 
 124. See Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market 
Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 48–49 
(2001) (finding that the stock market negatively reacts to the disclosure of trade secret theft). 
 125. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
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to offset these reputational costs provides little incentive for private companies 
to report theft.126 
3.  Inadequate IT and Compliance Capabilities 
Some business managers view investment in IT programs as an unnecessary 
cost.127  Indeed, companies may reach a level of sophistication at which 
investment in IT safeguards has a negative impact on the company’s ability to 
compete with market prices.128  However, IT capabilities have a demonstrably 
positive effect on business strategy and have a significant impact on a 
company’s bottom line.129  The perception of investment in IT as a cost driver 
may, therefore, lead to suboptimal investments in IT capabilities meant to 
safeguard a company’s most valuable technologies and knowledge-based 
assets.130 
Accordingly, it is crucial for businesses to integrate IT security programs 
into their top leadership team, as well as into legal and compliance 
departments.131  Multifunctional coordination of IT resources is important for 
security because it can contribute to successful legal outcomes in the event of a 
breach,132 as well as to help companies proactively keep track of information 
moving within and in and out of the organization.133  To compound the 
problem, companies increasingly rely on a “high velocity” and contingent 
workforce, which may facilitate the movement of sensitive information.134  
The highly mobile state of information in modern business justifies investment 
                                                 
 126. Civil relief under the EEA constitutes injunctive relief.  18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2006).  The 
statute provides no private cause of action for damages.  Id. 
 127. Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 9 (2008). 
 128. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Lessons for Cybersecurity?, STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 18, 28 
(2011) (noting that “[f]irms have an incentive to provide for their own security up to a point, but 
the competitive pricing of their products limits” those expenditures). 
 129. Bird, supra note 127, at 10. 
 130. See Nye, supra note 128, at 28–29 (concluding that there is “an underinvestment in 
security from the national perspective”). 
 131. See Russell Beck & Matt Karlyn, IT Security: A Practical Approach to Protecting Trade 
Secrets, CIO (Nov. 11 2009), http://www.cio.com/article/507359/IT_Security_A_Practical 
_Approach_to_Protecting_Trade_Secrets?page=3&taxonomyId=3187 (advocating for 
cooperation between business owners and directors, legal counsel, and IT departments to protect 
their companies from trade secret theft). 
 132. See David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management Resource, 
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687, 687–94 (2010) (discussing the importance of integrating legal and 
managerial knowledge as a source of competitive advantage); David Orozco, Rational Design 
Rights Ignorance, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 573, 603–04 (2009) (discussing how companies can obtain 
unique and rare intellectual property outcomes by reducing coordination costs within the firm). 
 133. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at i, 3 (noting that businesses are often uninformed of 
how information moves within and outside of the boundaries of the organization and that “[m]any 
companies are unaware when their sensitive data is pilfered”). 
 134. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 31, at 1004. 
898 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:877 
in state-of-the-art IT security programs and the addition of IT representatives 
to various levels and departments within an organization. 
C.  Agency-Related Legal Impediments 
In addition to market failures and high transaction costs, deficiencies in the 
general legal framework result in poor management and enforcement of trade 
secret laws and insufficient reporting of trade secret theft.  The two most 
problematic impediments to the enforcement of trade secret laws are the 
inadequate protection of whistleblowers and lax corporate governance 
requirements. 
1.  Inadequate Protection of Whistleblowers 
None of the existing trade secret statutory regimes require a party to report a 
suspected trade secret theft.135  Additionally, none of the statutes provide 
whistleblower protection for an individual who discloses trade secret theft and 
consequently faces retaliation from his employer.136 
Although the majority of states have enacted laws to shield public 
employees from retaliation by their employers, few states extend that 
protection to employees of private companies.137  Moreover, state 
whistleblower laws vary significantly in the level of protection offered to 
employees.138  Employers are also able to circumvent whistleblower protection 
laws by hiring at-will employees, who can be fired at any time and for any 
reason—including purely retaliatory discharge—without exposing the 
employer to liability.139 
Because there is no affirmative legal duty to disclose trade secret theft, 
existing state laws largely fail to protect employees who report trade secret 
theft.  Many state whistleblower laws, however, require the disclosure to be of 
violations of law committed by the employer in order for the employee to 
qualify for protection from retaliation.140  Consequently, without a duty to 
                                                 
 135. See supra Part I.A. and accompanying text (detailing the federal and state regulation of 
trade secrets). 
 136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (no protection for whistleblowers); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 
(2006 & Supp. 2012) (same); 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006) (same); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
(1986) (same). 
 137. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower 
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 111 (2000); Kevin Rubenstein, Note, Internal Whistleblowing 
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV., 637, 643 (2007) (“Most states offer general whistleblower protection to public 
employees, while a minority of states provide the same protection to all workers.”). 
 138. Rubenstein, supra note 137. 
 139. Id. at 640 (observing that a “[s]trict application of [the at-will] doctrine would allow an 
employer to terminate a whistleblower without facing any liability even if the discharge was 
purely for retaliatory purposes”). 
 140. For example, New York’s whistleblower protection statute states that: 
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report trade secret theft and corresponding protection for the disclosing 
employee, an employer is free to take action against employees revealing trade 
secret theft without violating any law. 
Conversely, federal law offers a patchwork of whistleblower protection, but 
only in cases in which the specific statute grants immunity from retaliation.141  
The federal law that could offer the most protection to whistleblowers of trade 
secret misappropriation is Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.142 Section 
806 provides a civil remedy to any employee who suffers retaliation for 
reporting a securities fraud or violation, or the violation of any provision of 
federal law prohibiting fraud against shareholders.143  Section 806 applies to 
companies “with a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or that [are] required to file reports under 
                                                                                                                 
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee 
because such employee . . . discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a 
public body an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, 
rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger 
to the public health or safety, or which constitutes health care fraud. 
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 141. Some federal statutes offer protection for whistleblowers who charge or testify against 
their employers for violating the particular statute.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) 
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C.  
§ 2622(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006 & Supp. 2012) (prohibiting the discharge of 
an employee who reports violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006) 
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the National Labor Relations 
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation 
of the Equal Pay Act); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee 
who reports violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting 
the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1140 (2006 & Supp. 2012) 
(prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act); 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who 
reports violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006 & Supp. 
2011) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the False Claims Act); 
42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation 
of the Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an 
employee who reports violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) 
(2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports 
violation of the Energy Reorganization Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a) (2006) (prohibiting the 
discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Solid Waste Disposal Act); 42 U.S.C.  
§ 7622(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation of the Clean Air 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee who reports violation 
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). 
 142. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A). 
 143. § 806, 116 Stat. at 802. 
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Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”144  However, Section 
806 would likely fail to offer relief to an employee suffering from retaliation 
by his employer as a consequence of disclosing trade secret theft because the 
failure to report trade secret misappropriation has never been classified as a 
fraud on a company’s shareholders.145  Furthermore, because Section 806 
applies to only the small subset of public companies registered under Section 
12, many of the companies most vulnerable to trade secret theft—those 
companies developing technologies that affect national security—fall outside 
of the statute’s reach.146 
2.  Ineffective Corporate Fiduciary Law 
A basic tenet of American law is that a corporation’s directors and 
executives have a fiduciary duty to the organization.  The fiduciary 
relationship is created by the law of agency, under which the agent agrees to 
act on the principal’s behalf and is subject to the principal’s control.147  This 
relationship creates duties and corresponding rights between the parties.148 
Existing corporate fiduciary laws are poorly equipped to address cases 
involving trade secret theft, particularly those cases involving a foreign state 
-sponsored entity.  Consequently, if a foreign actor misappropriates trade 
secrets as the result of the breach of a corporate fiduciary duty, there is no 
adequate safeguard to establish liability. 
a.  The Business Judgment Rule and Trade Secret Misappropriation 
Directors of a corporation are legally required to oversee fundamental 
transactions, such as the sale of the business, a merger, changes to the capital 
structure, and the appointment and compensation of the chief executive 
officer.149  These decisions are fundamental transactions of the corporation and 
are therefore evaluated under the business judgment rule.150  The business 
                                                 
 144. Id. 
 145. Cf. Rustad, supra note 9, at 474 (noting that there is no affirmative duty to report trade 
secret misappropriation); Rubenstein, supra note 137, at 647 (asserting that Sarbanes-Oxley 
protects employees reporting violations of securities laws, which excludes trade secret 
misappropriation). 
 146. See § 806, 116 Stat. at 802 (protecting only employees of companies registered under 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). 
 147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2005). 
 148. Id. at § 1.01 cmt. e (discussing the rights and duties of the agency relationship). 
 149. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (requiring the board of 
directors to authorize “significant corporate acts”); see also DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, 141(a) (“The 
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this [statute] shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this [statute] 
or in its certification of incorporation.”). 
 150. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding that the 
directors of the defendant corporation breached their duty of care to the corporation by failing to 
fully investigate before approving a merger), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 
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judgment rule protects the directors or officers if they act with adequate 
information, in good faith, and with the subjective belief that their action was 
in the best interests of the corporation.151 
The business judgment rule rests on the assumption that managers and 
directors have “skills, information[,] and judgment not possessed by reviewing 
courts, and [that] there is great social utility in encouraging the allocation of 
assets and the evaluation and assumption of economic risk by those with such 
skill and information.”152  Generally, courts avoid second-guessing legitimate 
business decisions.153  Delaware courts, for example, subscribe to the 
contractarian approach to corporate governance, which allows companies to 
determine their rights and responsibilities contractually, rather than rely on the 
legislature to allocate them statutorily.154 
As a consequence of the contractarian approach, Delaware courts apply the 
business judgment rule only in cases in which corporate directors act 
affirmatively; cases in which directors simply fail to act fall outside of the 
                                                                                                                 
965 A.2d 695, 713 & n. 54 (Del. 2009); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (explaining that the business 
judgment rule is applied to cases involving harmful decisions by the board of directors). 
 151. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 
(“[C]ompliance with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by 
reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from 
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed.”). 
 152. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (quoting 
Solash v. Telex Corp., C.A. No. 9518, 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988)). 
 153. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment 
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 587 (1994) (describing the rules in place 
to prevent “retrospective evaluations” of “negligent business decisions”).  Courts are keenly 
aware of the potential to engage in hindsight bias, or “the tendency for people with knowledge of 
an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe the outcome could have been 
predicted.”  Id. 
 154. Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More 
than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32J. CORP. L. 565, 569 (2007) (noting that contractarian 
states, including Delaware, “expressly defer to the parties’ agreement” in resolving corporate 
disputes).  The contractarian approach rests on the perception of the corporation as a collection of 
contracts or agreements by which the corporation can be governed.  See generally Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426, 1428 
(1989) (“The arrangements among the actors constituting the corporation usually depend on 
contracts and on positive law, not on corporate law or the status of the corporation as an entity.”).  
See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and 
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999) (describing the corporation as a 
“nexus of reciprocal agreements” relied upon to govern the company); Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318–28 (1993) (arguing that 
corporations use contracts to address both internal and external affairs).  Rather than favoring 
mandatory and uniform public regulation, contractarians favor private market-ordering 
transactions that allow shareholders and directors to opt in or out of regulations.  See J. Robert 
Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, 
and the Race to the Bottom 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (2009). 
902 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:877 
scope of the business judgment rule.155  Delaware courts instead evaluate 
inaction under the duty of loyalty, which requires plaintiffs to specifically 
plead that the directors or officers of the corporation intentionally acted 
against—or chose not to act in—the corporation’s best interests.156  Corporate 
directors or officers are, therefore, free from liability under most state 
corporate governance laws if they pay only cursory attention to trade secret 
reporting or management practices, even if they are grossly negligent in their 
inaction. 
b.  The Oversight Doctrine and Trade Secret Misappropriation 
Corporate governance law related to business processes, such as trade secret 
management, may also fall under the “oversight doctrine,” which has been 
developed over the years by Delaware courts.157  The oversight doctrine 
protects directors and some officers from personal liability unless they breach 
the duty of loyalty owed to the corporation.158 
The oversight doctrine stands for the proposition that the duty of loyalty may 
be breached if a director or officer neglects to impose information and 
reporting requirements.159  In In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
explained that “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith 
to assure that a corporate information and reporting system . . . exists and that 
                                                 
 155. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813. In practice, although the duty of care liability standard for 
affirmative decisions is perceived as lax, the Delaware Legislature tempered the standard by 
amending the Delaware General Corporation Law “to allow for an optional charter provision to 
exculpate directors for violations of the duty of care.”  See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good 
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 466 (2004).  This amendment allows a corporation to elect 
whether or not it wishes to immunize corporate directors and officers from any duty of care 
liability whatsoever.  Id.  Many corporations today provide this liability waiver. 
 156. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 & n.9, 370 (Del. 2006) (requiring the plaintiff to 
plead specific factual allegations, rather that conclusory, general, or speculative statements).  This 
specificity standard also requires the plaintiff include specific facts that indicate intent, which can 
be a difficult hurdle to overcome.  Id. 
 157. See Nadelle Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically 28–29 (Jan. 1, 2012) (Marquette 
Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 11-19) [hereinafter Duty to Think Strategically], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919145.  Delaware law has significant 
influence over general corporate governance law because most public corporations are 
incorporated in Delaware.  Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary 
Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 
(2007).  Other jurisdictions often look to Delaware law for guidance.  Id. 
 158. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (holding that a director breaches his duty of loyalty under 
the oversight doctrine if he completely neglects to enact a risk monitoring system, or he enacts a 
system but consciously fail to monitor it).  It remains unclear whether officers are held to the 
same standard as directors.  Although the existing Delaware cases involved actions by both 
directors and officers, the cases interpreting the oversight doctrine exclusively mention the duties 
imposed on and breached by directors.  See Duty to Think Strategically, supra note 157, at 32–33. 
 159. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 970, 970–71 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
2013] Amending the Economic Espionage Act 903 
failure to do so under some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for 
losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”160 
The general reaction following Caremark was that directors would face 
greater liability for deficient oversight of business performance, such as the 
mismanagement of trade secrets.161  However, the oversight doctrine was 
narrowed in subsequent cases, and it became clear that oversight issues would 
be assessed under the higher duty of loyalty standard.  Indeed, in Stone v. 
Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court refined Caremark’s mandate by outlining 
the evidence required to establish liability in business-oversight cases.162  Stone 
requires the plaintiff to show that either “(a) the directors utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having 
implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or 
oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks 
or problems requiring their attention.”163 
However, in practice, the test articulated in Stone offers little chance of 
recovery.  If the company has some type reporting system in place, it is not 
liable unless the plaintiff satisfies the difficult burden of proving that the 
director intentionally relinquished his monitoring responsibilities.164  
Consequently, the oversight doctrine often protects the director from liability 
so long as a control system exists, even if trade secret misappropriation or 
other harm results from an outdated or inadequate oversight mechanism that 
falls well behind the industry’s best practices.165  As explained in Caremark, 
director liability based on the duty of oversight “is possibly the most difficult 
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment.”166 
                                                 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, 
Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 691 (2004) (predicting that, following 
Caremark, “boards that fail to establish effective corporate compliance procedures may face 
substantial liability”). 
 162. 911 A.2d at 370 (“We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate 
for director oversight liability.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (emphasizing the disjunctive nature of the test articulated in Caremark). 
 165. See William W. Bratton, Lyondell: A Note of Approbation, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., 561, 
570–72 (2010) (arguing that Delaware’s “lesser rather than [] greater” approach in Caremark and 
Stone “slams down the book of best practices” because it requires “knowing and complete 
failure” to fulfill responsibilities); see also Perlroth, supra note 105 (arguing that, because there 
are no legal consequences for negligent monitoring, some companies have “a devil-may-care 
attitude toward data”).  Increasing corporate liability for business-related trade secrets may be 
appropriate, but considering a change in state corporate fiduciary law is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 166. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
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III.  POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AMENDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT 
The gap in the enforcement of trade secret protection laws, especially in 
situations of foreign trade secret theft, indicates that the EEA should be 
amended to increase protection of trade secret information.  This could best be 
accomplished by imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure of trade secret 
misappropriation that affects national security.167 
In American jurisprudence, affirmative legal duties are generally an 
exception to the rule favoring negative duties.168  It is well accepted that a 
governmental demand to perform is significantly more burdensome than a 
command to refrain from harmful action.169  As a result, the imposition of an 
affirmative duty requires strong public policy justifications.170  The public 
policy justifications for imposing an affirmative duty to disclose trade secret 
theft are detailed below. 
However, it is important to note that American law also recognizes that 
clearly defining the scope of an affirmative duty to perform minimizes the 
governmental intrusion.171  Here, the duty is clearly defined as a duty to report 
a trade secret theft if the theft applies to any technology that affects national 
security.172  This requirement would not impose an obligation to prevent the 
theft, or correct the harm arising from the theft.  Rather, the duty is simply to 
disclose the theft to an enforcement agency, which would then decide whether 
to pursue the matter if it involves a state-sponsored attack, a threat to national 
security, or if it would be useful to intelligence-gathering agencies. 
A.  Protection of the Public Interest 
An affirmative duty to act must be justified by a significant public 
interest.173  In the case of trade secret misappropriation, the significant public 
interest is the substantial value of information and the impact of the theft of 
that information on public welfare and national security. 
Many state governments have recognized the public interest in information 
security and have imposed affirmative disclosure duties in analogous cases of 
information theft.  For example, several states require companies to disclose 
                                                 
 167. See infra Part IV (proposing the text of the amendment and discussing its provisions and 
the benefits of imposing an affirmative duty to disclose). 
 168. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of 
the Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., 101, 104 (1984) (describing the “general 
reluctance in the United States to impose affirmative duties”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (arguing that an affirmative duty must be both justified by strong public policy 
benefits and “imposed in a way that minimizes the extent of the intrusion”). 
 171. Cf. id. (noting that the rule against affirmative duties is based, in part, on the difficulty 
of defining the scope of the duty, which makes the duty difficult to enforce). 
 172. See infra Part V (providing the text of the proposed amendment). 
 173. Robinson, supra note 168, at 104–05 (explaining that the public interest, including the 
health and safety of the public, can justify an affirmative duty). 
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breaches of data security.174  California was the first state to enact such a 
disclosure requirement with the Security Breach Notification Act.175  Other 
states followed suit and enacted similar legislation, and now forty-six states 
impose notification requirements.176  This trend suggests that more, if not all, 
states will adopt such legislation in the future. 
Similarly, several members of Congress recently proposed the Cybersecurity 
Act of 2012, which was written to protect critical domestic infrastructure from 
cyber warfare attacks.177  Had Congress passed the Act, it would have imposed 
an affirmative duty on companies that control critical infrastructure to report 
any “significant cyber incidents affecting critical cyber infrastructure.”178 
Additionally, some corporate governance laws impose an affirmative duty 
on managers in situations in which nondisclosure of information would cause 
significant harm to the corporation.179  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
requires the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of an organization to certify the 
correctness of financial statements and that the company has promulgated 
adequate internal controls.180  Likewise, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requires directors to take affirmative steps to ensure that 
the corporation’s communications with the public are truthful.181 
                                                 
 174. See Andrew B. Serwin, Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of Privacy 
Litigation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 884 (2009) (detailing the states that 
have enacted security breach laws that “mandate public disclosure of data incidents”). 
 175. Id.  The statute requires 
 [a]ny person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses 
computerized data that includes personal information, shall disclose any breach of the 
security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security 
of the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, 
or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.  The 
disclosure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable 
delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in 
subdivision (c), or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and 
restore the reasonable integrity of the data system. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 176. Serwin, supra note 174. 
 177. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.3414, 112th Cong. (2012).  The Act was originally 
introduced as S.2105, but the Senate voted on the version of the Act introduced as S.3414.  158 
CONG. REC. S.5919 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2012).  The Act ultimately failed a vote of cloture and was 
not passed.  Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (detailing the progression of the Act 
and its reintroduction in 2013). 
 178. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.3414, 112th Cong. § 102(b)(4) (2012).  “Critical cyber 
infrastructure” includes infrastructures that affect life-sustaining services and the U.S. economy.  
S.3414, § 102(b)(3)(B). 
 179. See Duty to Think Strategically, supra note 157, at 27 (explaining that the duties of 
loyalty and care require affirmative actions by directors of corporations). 
 180. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
 181. Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act 
Release No. 34,39157, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,963, at 89,893 (Sept. 
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B.  Protection of Critical Technologies with a Unified National Policy 
Adding a disclosure requirement to the EEA would also be consistent with 
the policy goals of export control laws.  Export control laws are aimed at 
regulating the export of tangible goods to prevent the use of those goods in a 
manner that may harm national interests.182  From a policy perspective, 
however, the laws’ emphasis on actual goods fails to ensure the protection of 
the underlying technology involved in creating the goods, allowing for 
recreation of the goods through reverse engineering.183 
Policymakers are increasingly recognizing the eroding distinction between 
goods and the underlying technology used to create them, viewing the nation’s 
infrastructure as a combination of tangible and intangible components.184  
Accordingly, because of the increasing technological competence and 
sophistication of foreign states and organizations,185 export control laws should 
regulate not only actual goods, but also the technology behind these goods. 
This can be accomplished by amending the EEA.  Requiring disclosure of the 
misappropriation of trade secret information will help to increase protection of 
the intellectual property associated with the manufacturing of some exported 
goods. 
C.  Expansion of Protection for Explicit Knowledge 
The importance of explicit knowledge to the modern economy provides 
additional justification for amending the EEA to address trade secret 
misappropriation.  The rapid evolution toward a knowledge-based economy 
has had a significant impact on business, society, and national 
competitiveness.186  One of the key challenges in this environment is to 
                                                                                                                 
30, 1997) (asserting that an officer or director of a public company has “substantial obligations” 
and that “[i]f an officer or director knows or should know that his or her company’s statements 
concerning particular issues are inadequate or incomplete, he or she has an obligation to correct 
that failure”). 
 182. See, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 3(2), 93 Stat. 503, 
504 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402 (2006)) (controlling the export of goods that “would 
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of 
countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States”). 
 183. Reverse engineering is an accepted form of recreating the item in question without 
misappropriating the information underlying its creation.  Ulrich, supra note 68, at 156–57 
(noting that reverse engineering is “implicitly accepted” by trade secret law). 
 184. See NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (2007) [hereinafter NCIX STRATEGY], 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/cistrategy2007.pdf (“In collaboration with our 
colleagues throughout the government, the counterintelligence community will protect our vital 
national assets—critical infrastructure, sensitive technologies, key resources, networks, and 
knowledge—from intelligence-related attack.”). 
 185. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 5–6 (describing the sophisticated techniques foreign 
actors use to misappropriate sensitive information). 
 186. See ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 1–2 (describing intangible assets and 
intellectual property as “the innovation that drives the American economy and supports jobs in 
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incentivize innovation, which is accomplished by protecting knowledge-based 
assets that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.187  Accordingly, the legal 
system has evolved to provide some measure of security and efficiency in the 
marketplace of ideas.188  Enforcement costs and ease of replication, however, 
pose significant challenges to innovators who wish to protect their intellectual 
property.189  The problem is compounded when business is conducted overseas 
in jurisdictions that do not adequately protect knowledge.190 
Trade secrets are especially vulnerable to this type of knowledge theft 
because companies routinely memorialize information.  In its tacit form, 
knowledge is difficult to perceive and replicate.191  The information used to 
develop important technologies, therefore, is often made explicit to extract its 
full value.192  However, when knowledge is made explicit and recorded, it is 
substantially easier to misappropriate the information.193  The codification of 
trade secret information creates an exact blueprint for replication and, if the 
information is misappropriated, the technology can easily be “reverse 
-engineered.”194 
Lastly, the process of creating a technology is often a key ingredient to using 
the technology.  For example, a manufacturing process may be the main source 
                                                                                                                 
the United States” and noting that this information affects American businesses and the economy, 
national security, and economic competitiveness); SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 4 
(discussing the value of information). 
 187. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 4 (arguing that owners of intellectual property 
are unable to recover the high production cost of information without the enforcement of their 
intellectual property rights). 
 188. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006) (prohibiting the infringement of copyrights); 18 U.S.C. 
1831–32 (2006) (protecting trade secrets from misappropriation); 35 U.S.C. 271 (2006 & Supp. 
2012) (prohibiting the infringement of patents). 
 189. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 101, at 3–4 (noting that intellectual property rights do 
not “confer complete power to control information” because the ability to copy and instantly send 
information around the world has made enforcement difficult). 
 190. See, e.g., Bai & Da, supra note 116, at 362–63 (stating that, even though China has 
implemented many laws and regulations to protect trade secrets, significant challenges exist due 
to technical and procedural aspects of the Chinese legal system). 
 191. See IKUJIRO NONAKA & HIROTAKA TAKEUCHI, THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING 
COMPANY: HOW JAPANESE COMPANIES CREATE THE DYNAMICS OF INFORMATION 8 (1995) 
(explaining that tacit knowledge, in part, consists of “hard-to-pin-down skills or crafts captured in 
the term ‘know-how’”). 
 192. Id. (“Explicit knowledge can be expressed in words and numbers, and easily 
communicated and shared in the form of hard data, scientific formulae, codified procedures, or 
universal principles.”). 
 193. Id. at 8–9.  Conversely, tacit knowledge is internalized and cannot be easily transmitted 
through formula or code.  Id. 
 194. For example, some codified technologies such as software are copied or reverse 
engineered when the source code is misappropriated.  See Markoff supra note 4, at A1 (predicting 
that the theft of Google’s software system will provide the hackers with the information needed to 
replicate—“reverse engineer”—Google’s system). 
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of competitive advantage for innovative manufacturing firms.195 If the process 
is tacit, it can be very difficult to replicate.196  Companies, however, often seek 
to record processes and business methods to increase the store of knowledge 
within the company.197  Often, this methodology is classified as a trade 
secret.198  Consequently, the misappropriation of a process-based technology 
may completely undermine the company’s competitive advantage.199 
IV.  AMENDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF 
TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION IN CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
The EEA should be amended to require disclosure of suspected outbound 
trade secret theft.  The amendment would read as follows: 
No person with reasonable knowledge that a violation of this Act has 
been or is being committed with respect to technologies that are 
subject to export regulations shall fail to report such information to a 
federal law enforcement agency. 
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than $_____ or 
imprisoned more than _____ years, or both. 
The proposed amendment would both serve the policy goals explained 
above and encourage better data security to protect trade secret information 
and, as a consequence, national security. 
The technologies affected by the amendment are those that qualify as trade 
secrets under the EEA.200  The technologies and products that are regulated by 
export laws but that are not considered trade secrets by the EEA are excluded 
by the amendment.  Technologies that both qualify as trade secrets under the 
EEA and are subject to export control, however, are covered by the 
amendment. 
Although some whistleblower laws require actual knowledge of a 
violation,201 the proposed amendment imposes a lesser mens rea standard by 
                                                 
 195. See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2012) (noting that 
business methodology and “fundamental business techniques” are important economic resources). 
 196. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 191, at 8–9 (explaining that tact knowledge is 
internal and not easily disseminated). 
 197. See Orozco, supra note 195, at 8–14 (explaining that some business methods can be 
converted into explicit knowledge, which takes the form of a utility patent). 
 198. See, e.g., TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1325 (classifying a manufacturing process as a 
trade secret). 
 199. See id. (emphasizing the need for a remedy for the misappropriation of a business 
process). 
 200. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006). 
 201. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2013) (prohibiting 
retaliatory action against an employee where the employee discloses or threatens to disclose a 
practice that “is in violation of law” (emphasis added)). 
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requiring reasonable knowledge of a violation.  Several data security breach 
and whistleblower statutes impose a similar reasonable knowledge standard.202  
A reasonable knowledge requirement is appropriate because although trade 
secret misappropriation can be difficult to ascertain due to the thieves’ efforts 
to conceal the activity,203 there are still indicators that signal trade secret theft.  
For example, a company’s IT department may have knowledge of a data 
breach that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that trade secrets were 
accessed or obtained. 
The proposed amendment also imposes a substantial penalty on any 
individual who fails to report a suspected trade secret theft.  As with many 
other white collar offenses, prosecutors may evaluate the defendant’s level of 
culpability and conclude that imposing a fine is more appropriate than criminal 
penalties.204  Likewise, judges may rely on the organizational sentencing 
guidelines to impose the most effective fine. 
Prosecutors may also reach a settlement agreement that defers or avoids 
criminal prosecution if the defendant agrees to institute a compliance 
program.205  Such compliance programs typically encompass: (1) a written 
policy related to the legal issue distributed throughout the company;  
(2) employee training; (3) improved recordkeeping; (4) compliance 
certification at all organizational levels; (5) internal audits and, sometimes, 
external monitoring; (6) improved screening of third party agents; and (7) a 
mechanism for rapid and thorough investigation if the defendant suspects a 
violation.206 
The proposed amendment imposes an affirmative duty to report suspected 
theft to federal enforcement authorities rather than to a superior within the 
organization.  This avoids the harm that might occur if the organization fails to 
take action.  Requiring a party to report the theft directly to a public 
                                                 
 202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (prohibiting retaliation of an 
employee who reports violation of securities laws); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009  
& Supp. 2013) (requiring disclosure if an individual reasonably believes that a data breach has 
occurred); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2008) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee 
who “has reasonable cause to believe” that the employer has violated the law); see also Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 474–75 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering 
whether an employee’s allegations against his employer were reasonable under the Clean Water 
Act, which would provide him immunity from retaliation). 
 203. See Rustad, supra note 9, at 481–82 (highlighting the measures taken by computer 
hackers to preserve anonymity, including “false email headers, offshore sites, and anonymous  
e-mailers”). 
 204. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (g) (2006) (basing the defendant’s penalty on his level of 
culpability). 
 205. Virginia G. Maurer & Ralph E. Maurer, Rethinking Compliance Settlements and the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (discussing the 
prevalence of DOJ settlements in relation to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
 206. Id. 
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enforcement agency such as the FBI207 will help to alleviate the problems 
caused by companies failing to report suspected trade secret theft.208 
The proposed amendment also protects whistleblowers who comply with the 
statute’s disclosure requirement from retaliation by their employers.  Likewise, 
if an individual within an organization has knowledge that another individual 
within the organization has violated the amendment by failing to report a 
suspected trade secret theft, he may alert law enforcement with immunity from 
retaliation by the organization.  Immunity under the amendment is afforded by 
the existing federal obstruction of justice statute, which states that: 
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action 
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful 
employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law 
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the 
commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.209 
The proposed amendment will also improve data security practice among 
organizations that develop the affected technologies.  Most companies go to 
great lengths to avoid prosecuting trade secret thefts because of the burdens 
imposed by the EEA.210  The proposed amendment provides government 
enforcement and prosecuting agencies with the opportunity to prosecute 
previously unreported theft, which in turn will help to improve data security.  
Increased prosecution of the EEA will signal that lax security practices will 
likely lead to sanctions under the amendment.211  To avoid the difficulties 
associated with prosecuting trade secret theft under the EEA, companies will 
be more willing to increase security to avoid reporting suspected trade secret 
theft in the first place. 
                                                 
 207. Counterintelligence efforts to protect U.S. economic interests are the FBI’s second 
priority, after terrorism. Counterintelligence: Economic Espionage, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic 
-espionage (last visited Sept. 8, 2013).  To achieve this high priority, the FBI has a dedicated 
Economic Espionage Unit.  Id. 
 208. See supra Part II and accompanying text (discussing the under-enforcement of trade 
secret laws). 
 209. 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 210. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text (detailing the difficulties in litigating a 
claim under the EEA). 
 211. Given the close nexus between employment, American competitiveness and trade 
secrets, the political climate has been receptive to greater trade secret enforcement actions.  See, 
e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Joins in Launch of 
Administration’s Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement as Part of Ongoing IP 
Initiative (June 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-722.html. 
(reporting that the DOJ has increased efforts and resources to prosecute trade secret cases in 
response to the Obama Administration’s first-ever Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property 
Enforcement, which resulted in a new DOJ Task Force on Intellectual Property). 
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In sum, organizations would have an additional and powerful incentive to 
create programs to encourage compliance with the amendment’s reporting 
requirement.212  Entities that develop technologies relevant to national security 
would implement more robust network security programs and better human 
resource practices in order to safeguard trade secrets and avoid the penalties for 
failing to report a breach.  Additionally, under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, an organization may implement a compliance program that bolsters 
data security as part of a settlement agreement with the Department of 
Justice.213 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Trade secret law protects the owner of valuable knowledge from 
misappropriation of the information by third parties.  The current legal regime 
is largely designed to protect trade secrets from theft by domestic actors.  As a 
consequence, the current regime fails to protect many trade secrets that are 
stolen by foreign state-sponsored entities.  This problem is compounded when 
the misappropriated trade secrets involve technologies that affect national 
security. 
Amending the EEA to mandate disclosure of suspected trade secret thefts 
related to any technology that is subject to export restriction would help to 
protect information relevant to national security.  Mandated disclosure would 
help to address the underreporting of foreign trade secret theft, which impedes 
the EEA’s goal of deterrence; inspire better trade secret management practices; 
protect whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers retaliation; and 
encourage cooperation between companies that develop sensitive technologies 
and federal law enforcement agencies, which is necessary to safeguard the 
nation’s critical infrastructure and knowledge-based assets. 
  
                                                 
 212. A firm’s audit committee and compliance director would appropriately oversee 
compliance with this amendment. 
 213. Maurer & Maurer, supra note 205. 
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